After the Second World War, the economy in many European countries was in bad shape and there were food shortages. European countries realized more and more that cooperation and free trade was necessary in order to provide themselves with food. Therefore, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was established, but not without a struggle. Establishing a joint policy in such a fragmented and complex policy area as agriculture, and the way in which this was done, is exemplary for the often opportunistic and nationalistic attitude of countries and cooperation in Europe. The central question in this article is therefore whether the CAP has turned out to be Europe's salvation or Achilles heel.

The CAP is realized as one of the examples of free trade in Europe. After the Second World War, a united effort was made to rebuild Europe. The International Trade Organization (ITO) was the proposed name for an international institution for the regulation of trade. Until the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1994, international trade was managed through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OECC) came into being in 1948. It emerged from the Marshall Plan (of the U.S.) and the Conference of Sixteen (Conference for European Economic Co-operation), which was superseded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a worldwide body, in 1961. With the Treaty of Rome (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty)), the European Economic Community (‘the Community’) was concluded between six member states: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The goal was a ‘common market’ with free movement of persons, goods and services, with the aim of greater growth and prosperity. This also laid the foundations for the CAP. [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8]

In 1957, ‘the six’ deliberately chose to bring agriculture into the common market, to prevent one or more countries striking preferential agricultural deals with France. [9 10 11 12] France ratified the Treaty of Rome so French agricultural products, which were heavily subsidized, could be sold in the other countries, in exchange for opening up the French market to (West German) non-agricultural products. [13 14 15] The possibility of liberalizing intra-European trade in agriculture had first been addressed by France, its so-called ‘Green Pool’, which ended in the creation of a Committee of Agricultural Ministers within the OECC. The Netherlands pushed for a supranational common agricultural policy, only finding sympathy for this in France. France also wanted bilateral agricultural deals with any of the other OECC members. Britain, on the other hand, completely opposed any discussion of agricultural trade liberalization and Italy wanted better market access for its agricultural exports. The other European countries were completely opposed to supranationality or to any other automatic measures that would impinge on their domestic agricultural support. [16] However, member countries’ efforts to boost agricultural production by any domestic policy means could be at the expense of other countries’ export positions within OEEC markets. The classic example was Britain, where subsidies to domestic egg producers transformed the country within a decade from major egg importing country to self-sufficiency, at the expense of other egg exporters. That is why Dutch policy-makers were so insistent on bringing all domestic agricultural policies under supranational control.[17] If the free market had been limited to industrial products, this would have been very beneficial for the emerging industrial country of Germany, at the expense of traditional agricultural economies such as France and the Netherlands. [18 19 20 21] In short, national intervention mechanisms which were incompatible with the common market had to be transferred to Community level: this is the basic rationale behind the establishment of the CAP. [22]

Counterbalancing French influence, the five other member states of the Community had welcomed enlargement of the Community, especially the British membership. However, French President De Gaulle (1959-1969) blocked this. 23 24 25 The British were initially not too keen on European cooperation, as they estimated that the long-term losses from joining a Europe-wide customs union would be too large (compared to their independent leadership within the Commonwealth and the special relationship with the United States). 26 When the British finally realized that they might be better off by joining the Community, they were too late. The French President Pompidou (1969-1974) accepted the principle of enlargement but in such a way that the funding agreement of the CAP was realized devoid of any input from those countries that wished to join the Community (such as Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark). As a result, countries that imported a lot and produced relatively few agricultural products themselves paid more to the Community than countries that mainly exported. The CAP made up about half of the European budget, so it involved serious amounts. Great Britain, which nevertheless joined the Community in 1973, became a net contributor to the Community. [27 28 29 30]

The aims of the CAP were to secure the supply of agricultural produce by means of increasing production, stabilizing prices and providing farmers with an adequate standard of living. Thanks to the CAP there have been no more food shortages in Europe. On the other hand, political elites did not simply shift en masse to advocacy of supranational Europe. Especially France wanted to perpetuate German weakness while rebuilding French strength. [31] With the addition of agricultural policy to The Community other countries became more urgent to join. However, the form of the proposals proved to be a continuous fragile balance between national and supranational European interests, figuring the negotiations for the Community later in the decade. [32 33 34 35 36] France's dominant position in the CAP, the individual member states' focus on their own economies and the disparity between Britain's low rate of economic growth and high budgetary contributions, with Brexit as a result, have finally proved to be the Achilles’ heel of European cooperation.

Anja Haga